Is Prenatal Diagnosis Discriminatory Towards People With Disabilities?

Abstract

The recent dialogue on abortion, largely implicating the life of the child-to-be, has been a fiery one—but little has been said about possible effects on the living, an oft overlooked locus of interrogation in this debate. While recent genetic techniques that locate disability in fetuses have been frequently proclaimed as opportune advancements in our culture, it has been argued by those in the disability rights community that such procedures have discriminatory effects on the currently disabled members of our society. It is argued that restricting a potential life due to the presence of a disability directly sends a message that the lives of those living with the same disability are of marginal value. I plan to show that many abortions which aim to prevent the birth of a disabled child can indeed be regarded as discriminatory. When abortions are acts that are based on uninformed societal views of the undesirability of a specific disability, then those who opt for an abortion may be implying that their disabled fetus has no right to life. In utilizing such unenlightened views to categorically prevent a fetus’ prospective life, a prima facie form of discrimination directed towards those currently living with a similar disability is expressed.