A Right but Not a Duty: The Morality of Dying

Edited by Sana Paracha

Abstract

I aim to establish that a limited right to die is ethical, but that a duty to die is unjustifiable. I argue for the morality of complying with requests for assistance in dying in cases of terminal and painful illness, drawing on existing social and medical precedent around requests for withdrawal of treatment. I then deny that this right implies any moral duty to die, arguing that any such duty is dependent on unduly placing social responsibilities on individual patients, as well as on a broader and troubling rejection of human interdependence. Finally, I examine the Canadian implementation of a right to die as an example of how, when not carefully implemented, such a right can lead to a social imposition of the duty to die. I argue that this is unconscionable, and explore how we may avoid it while maintaining the limited right to die.